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Abstract. In 2016, venda et al. (USENIX 2016, The Million-key Ques-
tion) reported that the implementation choices in cryptographic libraries
allow for qualified guessing about the origin of public RSA keys. We ex-
tend the technique to two new scenarios when not only public but also
private keys are available for the origin attribution – analysis of a source
of GCD-factorable keys in IPv4-wide TLS scans and forensic investiga-
tion of an unknown source. We learn several representatives of the bias
from the private keys to train a model on more than 150 million keys
collected from 70 cryptographic libraries, hardware security modules and
cryptographic smartcards. Our model not only doubles the number of dis-
tinguishable groups of libraries (compared to public keys from venda et
al.) but also improves more than twice in accuracy w.r.t. random guess-
ing when a single key is classified. For a forensic scenario where at least
10 keys from the same source are available, the correct origin library is
correctly identified with average accuracy of 89% compared to 4% accu-
racy of a random guess. The technique was also used to identify libraries
producing GCD-factorable TLS keys, showing that only three groups are
the probable suspects.
Keywords: Cryptographic library · RSA factorization · Measurement ·
RSA key classification · Statistical model.
1 Introduction
The ability to attribute a cryptographic key to the library it was generated with
is a valuable asset providing direct insight into cryptographic practices. The
slight bias found specifically in the primes of RSA private keys generated by
the OpenSSL library [14] allowed to track down the devices responsible for keys
found in TLS IPv4-wide scans that were in fact factorable by distributed GCD
algorithm. Further work [23] made the method generic and showed that many
other libraries produce biased keys allowing for the origin attribution. As a result,
? Full details, datasets and paper supplementary material can be found at https://
crocs.fi.muni.cz/papers/privrsa esorics20
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both separate keys, as well as large datasets, could be analyzed for their origin
libraries. The first-ever explicit measurement of cryptographic library popularity
was introduced in [18], showing the increasing dominance of the OpenSSL library
on the market. Furthermore, very uncommon characteristics of the library used
by Infineon smartcards allowed for their entirely accurate classification. Impor-
tantly, this led to a discovery that the library is, in fact, producing practically
factorable keys [19]. Consequently, more than 20 million of eID certificates with
vulnerable keys were revoked just in Europe alone. The same method allowed to
identify keys originating from unexpected sources in Estonian eIDs. Eventually,
the unexpected keys were shown to be injected from outside instead of being
generated on-chip as mandated by the institutional policy [20].
While properties of RSA primes were analyzed to understand the bias de-
tected in public keys, no previous work addressed the origin attribution problem
with the knowledge of private keys. The reason may sound understandable –
while the public keys are readily available in most usage domains, the private
keys shall be kept secret, therefore unavailable for such scrutiny. Yet there are
at least two important scenarios for their analysis: 1) Tracking sources of GCD-
factorable keys from large TLS scans and 2) a forensic identification of black-box
devices with the capability to export private keys (e.g., unknown smartcard, re-
mote key generation service, or in-house investigation of cryptographic services).
The mentioned case of unexpected keys in Estonian eIDs [20] is a practical ex-
ample of a forensic scenario, but with the use of public keys only. The analysis
based on private keys can spot even a smaller deviance from the expected origin
as the bias is observed closer to the place of its inception. This work aims to fill
this gap in knowledge by a careful examination of both scenarios.
We first provide a solid coverage of RSA key sources used in the wild by ex-
panding upon the dataset first released in [23]. During our work, we more than
doubled the number of keys in the dataset, gathered from over 70 distinct crypto-
graphic software libraries, smartcards, and hardware security modules (HSMs).
Benefiting from 158.8 million keys, we study the bias affecting the primes p and
q. We transform known biased features of public keys to their private key ana-
logues and evaluate how they cluster sources of RSA keys into groups. We use
the features in multiple variants of Bayes classifier that are trained on 157 mil-
lion keys. Subsequently, we evaluate the performance of our classifiers on further
1.8 million keys isolated from the whole dataset. By doing so, we establish the
reliability results for the forensic case of use, when keys from a black-box sys-
tem are under scrutiny. On average, when looking at just a single key, our best
model is able to correctly classify 47% of cases when all libraries are considered
and 64.6% keys when the specific sub-domain of smartcards is considered. These
results allow for much more precise classification compared to the scenario when
only public keys are available.
Finally, we use the best-performing classification method to analyze the
dataset of GCD-factorable RSA keys from the IPv4-wide TLS scan collected
by Rapid7 [21].
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The main contributions of this paper are:
– A systematic mapping of biased features of RSA keys evaluated on a more
exhaustive set of cryptographic libraries, described in Section 2. The dataset
(made publicly available for other researchers) lead to 26 total groups of
libraries distinguishable based on the features extracted from the value of
RSA private key(s).
– Detailed evaluation of the dataset on Bayes classifiers in Section 3 with an
average accuracy above 47% where only a single key is available, and almost
90% when ten keys are available.
– An analysis of the narrow domain of cryptographic smartcards and libraries
used for TLS results in an even higher accuracy, as shown in Section 4.
– Practical analysis of real-world sources of GCD-factorable RSA keys from
public TLS servers obtained from internet-wide scans in Section 5.
The paper roadmap has been partly outlined above, Section 7 then shows
related work and Section 8 concludes our paper.
2 Bias in RSA keys
Various design and implementation decisions in the algorithms for generating
RSA keys influence the distributions of produced RSA keys. A specific type of
bias was used to identify OpenSSL as the origin of a group of private keys [17].
Systematic studies of a wide range of libraries [23,18] described more reasons
for biases in RSA keys in a surprising number of libraries. In the majority of
cases, the bias was not strong enough to help factor the keys more efficiently.
Previous research [23] identified multiple sources of bias that our observations
from a large dataset of private RSA keys confirm:
1. Performance optimizations, e.g., most significant bits of primes set to a
fixed value to obtain RSA moduli of a defined length.
2. Type of primes: probable, strong, and provable primes:
– For probable primes, whether candidate values for primes are chosen
randomly or a single starting value is incremented until a prime is found.
– When generating candidates for probable primes, small factors are avoided
in the value of p− 1 by multiple implementations without explaining.
– Blum integers are sometimes used for RSA moduli – both RSA primes
are congruent to 3 modulo 4.
– For strong primes, the size of the auxiliary prime factors of p − 1 and
p + 1 is biased.
– For provable primes, the recursive algorithm can create new primes of
double to triple the binary length of a given prime; usually one version
of the algorithm is chosen.
3. Ordering of primes: are the RSA primes in private key ordered by size?
4. Proprietary algorithms, e.g., the well-documented case of Infineon fast
prime key generation algorithm [19].
5. Bias in the output of a PRNG: often observable only from a large number
of keys from the same source;
6. Natural properties of primes that do not depend on the implementation.
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2.1 Dataset of RSA keys
We collected, analyzed, and published the largest dataset of RSA keys with a
known origin from 70 libraries (43 open-source libraries, 5 black-box libraries,
3 HSMs, 19 smartcards). We both expanded the datasets from previous work
[23,18] and generated new keys from additional libraries for the sake of this study.
We processed the keys to a unified format and made them publicly available.
Where possible, we analyzed the source code of the cryptographic library to
identify the basic properties of key generation according to the list above.
We are primarily interested in 2048-bit keys, what is the most commonly
used key length for RSA. As in previous studies [23,18], we also generate shorter
keys (512 and 1024 bits) to speed up the process, while verifying that the cho-
sen biased features are not influenced by the key size. This makes the keys of
different sizes interchangeable for the sake of our study. We assume that repeat-
edly running the key generation locally approximates the distributed behaviour
of many instances of the same library. This model is supported by the mea-
surements taken in [18] where distributions of keys collected from the Internet
exhibited the same biases as locally generated keys.
2.2 Choice of relevant biased features
We extended the features used in previous work on public keys to their equivalent
properties of private keys:
Feature ‘5p and 5q’: Instead of the most significant bits of the modulus, we
use five most significant bits of the primes p and q. The modulus is defined
by the primes, and the primes naturally provide more information. We chose 5
bits based on a frequency analysis of high bits. Further bits are typically not
biased and reducing the size of this feature prevents an exponential growth of
the feature space.
Feature ‘blum’: We replaced the feature of second least significant bit of the
modulus by the detection of Blum integers. Blum integers can be directly iden-
tified using the two prime factors. When only the modulus is available, we can
rule out the usage of Blum integers, but not confirm it.
Feature ‘mod’: Previous work used the result of modulus modulo 3. It was
known that primes can be biased modulo small primes (due to avoiding small
factors of p−1 and q−1). The authors only used the value 3, because it is possible
to rule out that 3 is being avoided as a factor of p− 1, when the modulus equals
2 modulo 3 [23]. It is not possible to rule out higher factors from just a single
modulus. With the access to the primes we can directly check for this bias for
all factors. We detected four categories of such bias, each avoiding all small odd
prime factors up to a threshold. We use these categories directly by looking at
small odd divisors of p − 1 and q − 1 and note if none were detected: 1) up to
17863, 2) up to 251, 3) up to 5, 4) none – at least one value is divisible by 3.
Feature ‘roca’: We use a specific fingerprint of factorable Infineon keys pub-
lished in [19].
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Manhattan distance
Group  1 (Infineon JTOP 80K)
Group 26 (G&D StarSign)
Group  3 (G&D SmartCafe 3.2)
Group  2 (G&D SmartCafe 4.x, G&D SmartCafe 6.0)
Group  4 (PGP SDK FIPS)
Group  5 (Mocana)
Group  6 (PGP SDK)
Group  7 (Libgcrypt, Libgcrypt FIPS)
Group  8 (PuTTY, mbedTLS)
Group  9 (Bouncy Castle 1.53, SunRsaSign)
Group 10 (Bouncy Castle 1.54, Mocana, Thales)
Group 11 (Feitian JavaCOS A22, Feitian JavaCOS A40, Oberthur Cosmo 64, 
                                                                                          SafeNet, cryptlib)
Group 12 (Taisys SIMoME VAULT)
Group 13 (Gemalto GXP E64)
Group 15 (Athena IDProtect, Botan, Gemalto GCX4 72K, LibTomCrypt, 
                                                Nettle 3.2, Nettle 3.3, OpenSSL FIPS, WolfSSL)
Group 14 (Crypto++, Microsoft)
Group 16 (Utimaco)
Group 17 (Cryptix, FlexiProvider, Nettle 2.0, Sage Default)
Group 19 (GNU Crypto)
Group 18 (Sage Blum, Sage Provable)
Group 21 (NXP J2A080, NXP J2A081, NXP J3A081, NXP JCOP 41 V2.2.1)
Group 20 (Oberthur Cosmo Dual 72K)
Group 23 (NXP J2D081, NXP J2E145G (fingerprint 251))
Group 22 (NXP J2D081, NXP J2E145G (fingerprint 131))
Group 24 (OpenSSL)
Group 25 (OpenSSL (8-bit fingerprint))
Dendrogram for all groups
Fig. 1. How the keys from various libraries differ can be depicted by a dendrogram. It
tells us, w.r.t. our feature set, how far from each other the probability distributions of
the sources are. We can then hierarchically cluster the sources into groups that produce
similar keys. The blue line at 0.085 highlights the threshold of differentiating between
two sources/groups. This threshold yields 26 groups using our feature set.
2.3 Clustering of sources into groups
Since it is impossible to distinguish sources that produce identically distributed
keys, we introduce a process of clustering to merge similar sources into groups.
We cluster two sources together if they appear to be using identical algorithms
based on the observation of the key distributions. We measure the difference
in the distributions using the Manhattan distance4. The absolute values of the
distances depend on the actual distributions of the features. Large distances
correlate with significant differences in the implementations. Note, that very
small observed distances may be only the result of noise in the distributions
instead of a real difference, e.g., due to a smaller number of keys available.
We attempt to place the clustering threshold as low as possible, maximizing
the number of meaningful groups. If we are not able to explain why two clusters
are separated based on the study of the algorithms and distributions of the
4 We experimented with Euclidean distance and fractional norms. While Euclidean
distance is a proper metric, our experiments showed that it is more sensitive to
the noise in the data, creating separable groups out of sources that share the same
key generation algorithms. On the other hand, fractional norms did not highlight
differences between sources that provably differ in the key generation process.
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features, the threshold needs to be moved higher to join these clusters. We worked
with distributions that assume all features correlated (as in [23]).
The resulting classification groups and the dendrogram is shown in Figure
1. We placed the threshold value at 0.085. By moving it higher than to 0.154,
we would lose the ability to distinguish groups 11 and 12. It would be possible
to further split group 14, as there is a slight difference in the prime selection
intervals used by Crypto++ and Microsoft [23]. However, the difference manifests
less than the level of noise in other sources, requiring the threshold to be put
at 0.052, what would create several false groups. We use the same clustering
throughout the paper, although the value of the threshold would change when
the features change. Note that different versions of the same library may fall
into different groups, mostly because of the algorithm changes between these
versions. This, for instance, is the case of the Bouncy Castle 1.53, and 1.54.
3 Model selection and evaluation
How accurately we can classify the keys depends on several factors, most notably
on: the libraries included in the training set, number of keys available for clas-
sification, features extracted from the classified keys, and on the classification
model. In this section, we focus on the last factor.
3.1 Model selection
As generating the RSA keys is internally a stochastic process, we choose the
family of probabilistic models to address the source attribution problem. Since
there is no strong motivation for complex machine learning models, we utilize
simple classifiers. More sophisticated classifiers could be built based on our find-
ings when the goal is to reach higher accuracy or to more finely discriminate
sources within a group. The rest of this subsection describes the chosen models.
Nave Bayes classifier. The first investigated model is a nave Bayes classi-
fier, called nave because it assumes that the underlying features are conditionally
independent. Using this model, we apply the maximum-likelihood decision rule
and predict the label as yˆ = argmaxy P (X = x | y). Thanks to the nave assump-
tion, we may decompose this computation into yˆ = argmaxy
∏n
i=1 P (xi | y) for
the feature vector x = (x1, . . . , xn).
Bayes classifier. We continue to develop the approach originally used in [23]
that used the Bayes classifier without the nave assumption. Several reasons mo-
tivate this. First, it allows to evaluate how much the nave Bayes model suffers
from the violated independence assumption (on this specific dataset). Secondly,
it enables us to access more precise probability estimates that are needed to clas-
sify real-world GCD-factorable keys. Additionally, we can directly compare the
classification accuracy of private keys with the case of the public keys from [23].
However, one of the main drawbacks of the Bayes classifier is that it requires
exponentially more data with the growing number of features. Therefore, when
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striving for high accuracy achievable by further feature engineering, one should
consider the nave Bayes instead.
Nave Bayes classifier with cross-features. The third investigated option
is the nave Bayes classifier, but we merged selected features that are known
to be correlated into a single feature. In particular, we merged the features
of the most significant bits (of p, q) into a single cross-feature. Subsequently,
the nave Bayes approach is used. This enables us to evaluate whether merging
clearly interdependent features into one will affect the performance of nave Bayes
classifier w.r.t. this specific dataset.
3.2 Model evaluation
Methodology of classification and metrics. Our training dataset contains
157 million keys and the test set contains 1.8 million keys. We derived the test set
by discarding 10 thousand keys of each source from the complete dataset before
clustering. This assures that each group has the test set with at least 10 thousand
keys. Accordingly, since the groups differ in the number of sources involved, the
resulting test dataset is imbalanced. For this reason, we employ the metrics of
precision and recall when possible. However, we represent the model performance
by accuracy measure in the tables and in more complex classification scenarios.
For group X, the precision can be understood as a fraction of correctly clas-
sified keys from group X divided by the number of keys that were marked as
group X by our classifier. Similarly, the recall is a fraction of correctly classified
keys from group X divided by a total number of keys from group X [11]. We
also evaluate the performance of the models under the assumption that the user
has a batch of several keys from the same source at hand. This scenario can
arise, e.g., when a security audit is run in an organization and all keys are being
tested. Furthermore, to react to some often misclassified groups, we additionally
provide the answer “this key originates from group X or group Y ” to the user
(and we evaluate the confidence of these answers).
Comparison of the models. The overall comparison of all three models can
be seen in Table 1. If the precision for some group is undefined, i.e., no key is
allegedly originating from this group, we say that the precision is 0. We evaluate
the nave Bayes classifier on the same features that were used for Bayes classifier
Model Avg. precision Avg. recall
Bayes classifier 43.2% 47.6%
Nave Bayes classifier 40.9% 46.2%
Cross-feature nave B. 41.7% 47.6%
Table 1. Performance comparison of different models on the dataset with all libraries.
Note that the precision of a random guess classifier is 3.8% when considering 26 groups.
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to measure how much classification performance is lost by introducing the fea-
ture independence assumption. A typical example of interdependent features is
that the most significant bits of primes p and q are intentionally correlated to
preserve the expected length of the resulting modulus n. Pleasantly, the observed
precision (recall) decrease is only 2.3% (1.4%) when compared to the Bayes clas-
sifier. Accordingly, this suggests that a larger number of different features than
usable with the Bayes classifier (due to exponential growth in complexity) can be
considered when the nave Bayes classifier is used. As a result, further improve-
ment of the performance might be achieved, despite ignoring the dependencies
among features. Overall, the Bayes classifier shows the best results. When a sin-
gle key is classified, the average success rate for the 26 groups is captured by
precision of 43.2% and a recall of 47.6%. Still, there is a wide variance between
the performance in specific groups. A detailed table of results together with a
discussion is presented in Appendix A.
4 Classification with prior information
Section 2 outlined the process of choosing a threshold value that determines the
critical distance for distinguishing between distinct groups. Inevitably, the same
threshold value directly influences the number of groups after the clustering task.
As such, the threshold introduces a trade-off between the model performance
and the number of discriminated groups. The smaller the difference between
group distributions is, the more they are similar, and the model performance
is lower as more misclassification errors occur. The objective of this section is
to examine the classification scenario when some prior knowledge is available to
the analyst, limiting the origin of keys to only a subset of all libraries or increase
the likelihood of some. Since Section 3 showed that the Bayes classifier provides
the best performance, this chapter considers only this model.
Prior knowledge can be introduced into the classification process in multiple
ways, e.g., by using a prior probability vector that considers some groups more
prevalent. We also note that the measurement method of [18] can be used to
obtain such prior information, but a relatively large dataset (around 105 private
keys) is required that may not be available. Our work, therefore, considers a
different setting when some sources of the keys are ruled-out before the classifier
is constructed. Such scenario arises e.g., when the analyst knows that the scru-
tinized keys were generated in an unknown cryptographic smartcard. In such
case, HSMs and other sources of keys can thus be omitted from the model alto-
gether what will arguably increase the performance of the classification process.
Another example is leaving out libraries that were released after the classified
data sample was collected.
We present the classification performance results for three scenarios with a
limited number of sources – 1) cryptographic smartcards (Section 4.1), 2) sources
likely to be used in the TLS domain (Section 4.2) and 3) a specific case of GCD-
factorable keys from the TLS domain, where only one out of two primes can
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Dataset Avg. precision Avg. recall Random guess (baseline)
All libraries 43.2% 47.6% 3.8%
Smartcards domain 61.9% 64.6% 8.3%
TLS domain 45.5% 42.2% 7.7%
Single-prime TLS domain 28.8% 36.2% 11.1%
Table 2. Bayes classifier performance on three analyzed partitionings of the dataset
– complete dataset with all libraries (All libraries), smartcards only (Smartcards do-
main), libraries and HSMs expected to be used for TLS (TLS domain) and specific
subset of TLS domain where only single prime is available due to the nature of results
obtained by GCD factorization method (Single-prime TLS domain). Comparison with
the random guess as a baseline is provided (here, accuracy equals precision and recall).
be used for classification (see Section 4.3 for more details). The comparison of
models for these scenarios can be seen in Table 2.
To compute these models we first, discard the sources that cannot be the
origin of the examined keys according to the prior knowledge of the domain (e.g.,
smartcards are not expected in TLS). Next, we re-compute the clustering task to
obtain fewer groups than on the dataset with all libraries. Finally, we compute
the classification tables for the reduced domain and evaluate the performance.
4.1 Performance in the smartcards domain
012
Manhattan distance
Group  1 (Infineon JTOP 80K)
Group 12 (G&D StarSign)
Group  3 (G&D SmartCafe 3.2)
Group  2 (G&D SmartCafe 4.x, G&D SmartCafe 6.0)
Group  5 (NXP J2D081, NXP J2E145G (fingerprint 251))
Group  4 (NXP J2D081, NXP J2E145G (fingerprint 131))
Group  7 (Taisys SIMoME VAULT)
Group  6 (Feitian JavaCOS A22, Feitian JavaCOS A40, Oberthur Cosmo 64)
Group  9 (Athena IDProtect, Gemalto GCX4 72K)
Group  8 (Gemalto GXP E64)
Group 11 (NXP J2A080, NXP J2A081, NXP J3A081, NXP JCOP 41 V2.2.1)
Group 10 (Oberthur Cosmo Dual 72K)
                              Dendrogram for smartcard domain
Fig. 2. The clustering of smartcard sources yields 12 separate groups.
The clustering task in the smartcards domain yields 12 recognizable groups
for 19 different smartcard models as shown in Figure 2. The training set for
this limited domain contains 20.6 million keys, whereas the test set contains
340 thousand keys. On average, 61.9% precision and 64.6% recall is achieved.
10 Janovsky et al.
Moreover, 8 out of 12 groups achieve > 50% precision. Additionally, the clas-
sifier exhibits 100% recall on 3 specific groups: a) Infineon smartcards (before
2017 with the ROCA vulnerability [19]), b) G&D Smartcafe 4.x and 6.0, and
c) newer G&D Smartcafe 7.0. Figure 3 shows so-called confusion matrix where
each row corresponds to percentage of keys in an actual group while each column
represents percentage of keys in a predicted group.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Group predicted by our model
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Tr
ue
 g
ro
up
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0% 82% 15% 2% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0% 33% 53% 1% 1% 5% 5% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 86% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0% 3% 1% 7% 7% 0% 15% 67% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0% 0% 0% 7% 7% 0% 0% 87% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0% 20% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 49% 16% 1%
0% 21% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 54% 16% 1%
0% 14% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 12% 61% 9%
0% 12% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 26% 26% 30%
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Fig. 3. The confusion matrix for the classifier of a single private key generated in the
smartcards domain. A given row corresponds to a vector of observed relative frequen-
cies with which keys generated by a specific group (True group) are misclassified as
generated by other groups (Group predicted by our model). For example, group 1 and
group 2 have no misclassifications (high accuracy), while keys of group 3 are in 33%
cases misclassified as keys from group 2. On average, we achieve 64.6% accuracy. The
darker the cell is, the higher number it contains. This holds for all figures in this paper.
As expected, the results represent an improvement when compared to the
dataset with all libraries. When one has ten keys of the same card at hand, the
expected recall is over 90% on 10 out of 12 groups. The full table of results can
be found in the project repository.
Interestingly, 512- and 1024-bit keys generated by the same NXP J2E145G
card (similarly also for NXP J2D081) fall into different groups5. The main dif-
ference is in the modular fingerprint (avoidance of small factors in p − 1 and
q−1). We hypothesize that on-card key generation avoids more small factors for
5 This is an exception to the observation that the selected features behave indepen-
dently of key length. Otherwise, keys of different length can be used interchangeably.
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larger keys. Such behaviour was not observed for other libraries but highlights
the necessity of collecting different key lengths in the training dataset when one
analyzes black-box proprietary devices or closed-source software libraries.
To summarize, the classification of private keys generated by smartcards is
very accurate due to the significant differences resulting from the proprietary,
embedded implementations among the different vendors. The differences ob-
served likely results from the requirements to have a smaller footprint required
by low-resources devices.
4.2 Performance in the TLS domain
For the TLS domain, we excluded all the libraries and devices unlikely to be
used to generate keys then used by TLS servers. All smartcards are excluded,
together with highly outdated or purpose-specific libraries like PGP SDK 4.
All hardware security modules (HSMs) are present as they may be used as
TLS accelerators or high-security key storage. Summarized, we started with 17
separate cryptographic libraries and HSMs, inspected in a total of 134 versions.
The clustering resulted in 13 recognizable groups as shown in Figure 4.
The domain training set contains 121.8 million keys and the test set contains
1.3 million keys. On average, the classifier achieves 45.5% precision and 42.2%
recall. The decrease in average recall compared to the full domain may look
surprising, but averaging is deceiving in this context. In fact, recall improved for
10 out of 13 groups that are both in the full set and the TLS domain set, with
the precision improving for 9 groups. The mean values of the full dataset are
being uplifted by a generally better performance of the model outside the TLS
domain. Five groups have > 50% precision. OpenSSL (by far the most popular
library used by servers for TLS [18]) has 100% recall, making the classification
of OpenSSL keys very reliable. Complete results can be found in the project
repository.
To summarize, we correctly classify more keys in a more specific TLS domain
than with the full dataset classifier. Additionally, the user can be more confident
about the decisions of the TLS-specific classifier.
4.3 Performance in the single-prime TLS domain
The rest of this section is motivated by a setting when one wants to ana-
lyze a batch of correlated keys. Specifically, we assume a case of k ≥ 1 keys
(p1, q1), . . . , (pk, qk) generated by the same source, where p1 = p2 = · · · = pk.
This scenario emerges in Section 5 and cannot be addressed by previously con-
sidered classifiers. If applied, the results would be drastically skewed since the
classifier would consider each of pi separately, putting half of the weight on the
shared prime. For that reason, we train a classifier that works on single primes
rather than on complete private keys. Instead of feeding the classifier with a
batch of k private keys, we supply it with a batch of k + 1 unique primes from
those keys. The selected features were modified accordingly: we extract the 5
most significant bits from the unique prime, its second least significant bit, and
12 Janovsky et al.
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Group  1 (OpenSSL)
Group  2 (OpenSSL (8-bit fingerprint))
Group  3 (Sage Blum, Sage Provable)
Group  4 (Mocana)
Group  6 (Bouncy Castle 1.53, SunRsaSign)
Group  5 (mbedTLS)
Group  8 (SafeNet, cryptlib)
Group  7 (Bouncy Castle 1.54, Mocana, Thales)
Group  9 (Libgcrypt, Libgcrypt FIPS)
Group 10 (Botan, LibTomCrypt, Nettle 3.2, Nettle 3.3, 
                                                            OpenSSL FIPS, WolfSSL)
Group 11 (Crypto++, Microsoft)
Group 12 (Utimaco)
Group 13 (Nettle 2.0, Sage Default)
                              Dendrogram for TLS domain
Fig. 4. The clustering of the sources from the TLS domain yields 13 separate groups.
compute the ROCA and modular fingerprint for the single prime. We trained
the classifier on the learning set limited to the TLS domain, as in Section 4.2.
On average, we achieve 28.8% precision and 36.2% recall when classifying
a single prime. Table 3 shows the accuracy results in more detail. It should,
however, be stressed that this classifier is meant to be used for batches of many
keys at once. When considering a batch of k ≥ 10 primes, the accuracy is more
than 77%. The decrease in accuracy compared to Section 4.2 can be explained
by the loss of information from the second prime. The features mod and blum
are much less reliable when using only one prime. Since we can compute the
most significant bits from a single prime at a time, we lost the information
about the ordering of primes (since features 5p and 5q are correlated). These
facts resulted in only nine separate groups of libraries being distinguishable. The
following groups from the TLS domain are no longer mutually distinguishable:
5 and 13, 7 and 11, 8 and 9 and 10.
Number of primes in a batch
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Group 4
Group 5|13
Group 6
Group 7|11
Group 8|9|10
Group 12
Average
1 10 20 30 100
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
42.8% 99.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
78.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
47.5% 90.3% 95.8% 98.7% 100.0%
1.8% 30.8% 43.7% 51.8% 74.7%
5.2% 48.9% 61.0% 64.8% 76.7%
0.0% 67.3% 92.3% 97.4% 100.0%
37.9% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
12.8% 61.8% 77.7% 83.9% 97.2%
36.2% 77.6% 85.6% 88.5% 94.3%
Table 3. Classification accuracy for single-prime features evaluated on TLS domain.
Biased RSA private keys: Origin attribution of GCD-factorable keys 13
4.4 Methodology limitations
The presented methodology has several limitations:
Classification of an unseen source. Not all existing sources of RSA keys
are present in our dataset for clustering analysis and classification. This means
that attempting to classify a key from a source not considered in our study will
bring unpredictable results. The new source may either populate some existing
group or have a unique implementation, thus creating a new group. In both
cases, the behaviour of the classifier is unpredictable.
Granularity of the classifier. There are multiple libraries in a single group.
The user is therefore not shown the exact source of the key, but the whole group
instead. This limitation has two main reasons: 1) Some sources share the same
implementation and thus cannot be told apart. 2) The list of utilized features
is narrow. There are infinitely many possible features in principle and some
may hide valuable information that can further help the model performance.
Nevertheless, the proposed methodology allows for an automatic evaluation of
features using the nave Bayes method which shall be considered in future work.
Human factor. The clustering task in our study requires human knowledge.
To be specific, the value of the threshold that splits the libraries into groups (for
a particular feature) is established only semi-automatically. We manually con-
firmed the threshold – when we could explain the difference between the libraries,
or moved it otherwise. Summarized, this complicates the fully automatic evalua-
tion on a large number of potential features. Once solved, the relative importance
of the individual features could be measured.
5 Real-world GCD-factorable keys origin investigation
Previous research [16,14,13,2] demonstrated that a non-trivial fraction of RSA
keys used on publicly reachable TLS servers is generated insecurely and is prac-
tically factorable. This is because the affected network devices were found to in-
dependently generate RSA keys that share a single prime or both primes. While
an efficient factorization algorithm for RSA moduli is unknown, when two keys
accidentally share one prime, the efficient factorization is possible using the Eu-
clidean algorithm to find their GCD6. Still, the current number of public keys
obtained from crawling TLS servers is too high to allow for the investigation of
all possible pairs. However, the distributed GCD algorithm [15] allows analyzing
hundreds of millions of keys efficiently. Its performance was sufficient to analyze
all keys collected from IPv4-wide TLS scans [21,5] and resulted in almost 1% of
factorable keys in the scans collected at the beginning of the year 2016.
After the detection of GCD-factorable keys, the question of their origin natu-
rally followed. Previous research addressed it using two principal approaches: 1)
an analysis of the information extractable from the certificates of GCD-factorable
6 Note that the keys sharing both primes are not susceptible to this attack but reveal
their private keys to all other owners of the same RSA key pair.
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keys, and 2) matching specific properties of factored primes with primes gener-
ated by a suspected library – OpenSSL. The first approach allowed to detect
a range of network routers that seeded their PRNG shortly after boot without
enough entropy, what caused them to occasionally generate a prime shared with
another device. These routers contained a customized version of the OpenSSL
library, what was confirmed with the second approach, since OpenSSL code in-
tentionally avoids small factors of p− 1 as shown by [17].
While this suite of routers was clearly the primary source of the GCD-
factorable keys, are they the sole source of insecure keys? The paper [13] iden-
tified 23 router/device vendors that used the code of OpenSSL (using specific
OpenSSL fingerprint based on avoidance of small factors in p − 1 and informa-
tion extracted from the certificates). Eight other vendors (DrayRek, Fortinet,
Huawei, Juniper, Kronos, Siemens, Xerox, and ZyXEL) produced keys without
such OpenSSL fingerprint, and the underlying libraries remained unidentified. In
the rest of this section, we build upon the prior work to identify probable sources
of the GCD-factorable keys that do not originate from the OpenSSL library.
Two assumptions must be met to employ the classifier studied in Section 4.3.
First, we assume that when a batch of GCD-factored keys shares a prime, they
were all generated by sources from a single classification group. This conjecture
is suggested in [13,14] and supported by the fact that when distinct libraries
differ in their prime generation algorithm, they will produce different primes
even when initialized from the same seed. On the other hand, when they share
the same generation algorithm, they inevitably fall into the same classification
group. Second, we assume that if the malformed keys share only single prime, the
PRNG was reseeded with enough entropy before the second prime got generated.
This is suggested by the failure model studied for OpenSSL in [14] and implies
that the second prime is generated as it normally would be.
Leveraging these conjectures, the rest of this section tracks the libraries re-
sponsible for GCD-factorable keys while not relying on the information in the
certificates. First, we describe the dataset gathering process, as well as the fac-
torization of the RSA public keys. Later, successfully factored keys are analyzed,
followed with a discussion of findings.
6 Datasets of GCD-factorable TLS keys
The input dataset with public RSA keys (both secure and vulnerable ones) was
obtained from the Rapid7 archive. All scans between October 2013 and July 2019
(mostly in one or two weeks period) were downloaded and processed, resulting
in slightly over 170 million certificates. Only public RSA keys were extracted,
and duplicates removed, resulting in 112 million unique moduli. On this dataset,
the fastgcd [15] tool based on [3] was used to factorize the moduli into private
keys. A detailed methodology of this procedure is discussed in Appendix B.
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6.1 Batching of GCD-factorable keys
Would the precision and recall of our classifier be 100%, one could process the
factored keys one by one, establish their origin library and thus detect all sources
of insecure keys. But since the classification accuracy of the single-prime TLS
classifier7 with a single key is only 36%, we apply three adjustments: 1) batch
the GCD-factorable keys sharing the same prime (believed to be produced by
the same library); 2) analyze only the batches with at least 10 keys (therefore
with high expected accuracy); 3) limit the set of the libraries considered for
classification only to the single-prime TLS domain. Since the keys from the
OpenSSL library were already extensively analyzed by [13], we use the mod
feature to reliably mark and exclude them from further analysis. By doing so,
we concentrate primarily on the non-OpenSSL keys that were not yet attributed.
The exact process for classification of factored keys in batches is as follows:
1. Factorize public keys from a target dataset (e.g., Rapid7) using fastgcd tool.
2. Form batches of factored keys that share a prime and assume that they
originate from the same classification group.
3. Select only the batches with at least k keys (e.g., 10).
4. Separate batches of keys that all carry the OpenSSL fingerprint. As a control
experiment, they should classify only to a group with the OpenSSL library.
5. Separate batches without the OpenSSL fingerprint. This cluster contains yet
unidentified libraries.
6. Classify the non-OpenSSL cluster using a single-prime TLS classifier.
6.2 Source libraries detected in GCD-factorable TLS keys
Group(s) # batches
1 (OpenSSL) 2230
2 (8-bit OpenSSL) 3
8 | 9 | 10 (various libraries, see Figure 4) 278
3; 4; 6; 12; 5 | 13; 7 | 11 0 (improbable)
Table 4. Keys that share a prime factor belong to the same batch. Classification of
most batches resulted in OpenSSL as the likely source. The rest of the batches were
likely generated by libraries in the combined group 8 | 9 | 10.
In total, we analyzed more than 82 thousand primes divided into 2511 batches.
While each batch has at least 10 keys in it, the median of the batch size is 15.
Among the batches, 88.8% of them exhibit the OpenSSL fingerprint. This num-
ber well confirms the previous finding by [13] that also captured the OpenSSL-
specific fingerprint in a similar fraction of keys. We attribute three other batches
7 Note that without using single-prime model, the results are biased as the shared
prime is considered multiple times in the classification process.
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as coming from the OpenSSL (8-bit fingerprint), an OpenSSL library compiled
to test and avoid divisors of p−1 only up to 251. Importantly, slightly more than
11% of batches were generated by some library from groups 8, 9, or 10, which
are not mutually distinguishable when only a single prime is available. There are
also negative results to report. With the accuracy over 80% (for a batch size of
15) and no batches attributed to any of groups 3, 4, 6, 12, 5 | 13, or 7 | 11, it
is very improbable that any GCD-factorable keys originate from the respective
sources in these libraries.
7 Related work
The fingerprinting of devices based on their physical characteristics, exposed
interfaces, behaviour in non-standard or undefined situations, errors returned,
and a wide range of various other side-channels is a well-researched area. The
experience shows that finding a case of a non-standard behaviour is usually
possible, while making a group of devices indistinguishable is very difficult due
to an almost infinite number of observable characteristics, resulting in an arms
race between the device manufacturers and fingerprinting observers.
Having the device fingerprinted is helpful to better understand the complex
ecosystem like quantifying the presence of interception middle-boxes on the inter-
net [9], types of clients connected or version of the operating system. Differences
may help point out subverted supply chains or counterfeit products.
When applied to the study of cryptographic keys and cryptographic libraries,
researchers devised a range of techniques to analyze the fraction of encrypted
connections, the prevalence of particular cryptographic algorithms, the chosen
key lengths or cipher suites [8,10,2,1,12,4,24]. Information about a particular key
is frequently obtained from the metadata of its certificate.
Periodical network scans allow to assess the impact of security flaws in prac-
tice. The population of OpenSSL servers with the Heartbleed vulnerability was
measured and monitored by [7], and real attempts to exploit the bug were sur-
veyed. If the necessary information is coincidentally collected and archived, even
a backward introspection of a vulnerability in time might be possible.
The simple test for the ROCA vulnerability in public RSA keys allowed to
measure the fraction of citizens of Estonia who held an electronic ID supported
by a vulnerable smartcard, by inspecting the public repository of eID certificates
[19]. The fingerprinting of keys from smartcards was used to detect that private
keys were generated outside of the card and injected later into the eIDs, despite
the requirement to have all keys generated on-card [20].
The attribution of the public RSA key to its origin library was analyzed by
[23]. Measurements on large datasets were presented in [18], leading to accurate
estimation of the fraction of cryptographic libraries used in large datasets like
IPv4-wide TLS. While both [23] and [18] analyze the public keys, private keys
can be also obtained under certain conditions of faulty random number generator
[16,6,13,14,22]. The origin of weak factorable keys needs to be identified in order
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to notify the maintainers of the code to fix underlying issues. A combination of
key properties and values from certificates was used.
8 Conclusions
We provide what we believe is the first wide examination of properties of RSA
keys with the goal of attribution of private key to its origin library. The attribu-
tion is applicable in multiple scenarios, e.g., to the analysis of GCD-factorable
keys in the TLS domain. We investigated the properties of keys as generated by
70 cryptographic libraries, identified biased features in the primes produced, and
compared three models based on Bayes classifiers for the private key attribution.
The information available in private keys significantly increases the classifica-
tion performance compared to the result achieved on public keys [23]. Our work
enables to distinguish 26 groups of sources (compared to 13 on public keys) while
increasing the accuracy more than twice w.r.t. random guessing. When 100 keys
are available for the classification, the correct result is almost always provided
(> 99%) for 19 out of 26 groups.
Finally, we designed a method usable also for a dataset of keys where one
prime is significantly correlated. Such primes are found in GCD-factorable TLS
keys where one prime was generated with insufficient randomness and would
introduce a high classification error in the unmodified method. As a result, we
can identify libraries responsible for the production of these GCD-factorable
keys, showing that only three groups are a relevant source of such keys. The
accurate classification can be easily incorporated in forensic and audit tools.
While the bias in the keys usually does not help with factorization, the cryp-
tographic libraries should approach their key generation design with a great
care, as strong bias can lead to weak keys [19]. We recommend to follow a key
generation process with as little bias present as possible.
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A Detailed discussion of classifier results
Some groups are accurately classified and rarely misclassified even with a
single key available: namely group 1 (Infineon prior 2017, distinct because of
the ROCA fingerprint), group 2 (Giesecke&Devrient SmartCafe 4.x and 6.0),
group 24 (standard OpenSSL without the FIPS module enabled) and group 26
(Giesecke&Devrient SmartCafe 7.0) are all classified with more than 96% recall.
Groups 1, 2, and 26 are rarely misclassified as origin library (false positive).
The keys from group 25 (OpenSSL avoiding only 8-bit small factors in p − 1)
are misclassified as group 24 (standard OpenSSL) in 31.6% cases, which still
identifies the origin library correctly, only misidentifies the OpenSSL compile-
time configuration.
In contrast, keys from groups 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, and 17 are almost always
misclassified (less than 8% recall, some even less than 1%). However, as dis-
cussed in the next section, if some additional information is available and can
be considered, this misclassification can be largely remediated.
Keys from group 7 (Libgcrypt) are mostly misclassified as group 6 (PGP SDK
4, 64.5%) or group 13 (Gemalto GXP E64, 20.2%). As libgcrypt is a commonly
used library while groups 6 and 13 correspond to a very old library and card, this
case demonstrates the possibility for further classifier improvement when some
prior knowledge is available. E.g., for the TLS domain, groups corresponding to
old smartcards or non-TLS libraries can be ruled out from the process.
Group 10 (Bouncy Castle since 1.54, Mocana 7.x or HSM Thales nShieldF3)
is misclassified as group 12 (smartcard Taisys SIMoME, 36.3%) or group 5 (Mo-
cana 6.x 21.0%). Additional information can improve classification accuracy as
the Taisys smartcard is unlikely source for the most usage domains. If Mocana
library actually generated the key, only the identified version is incorrect.
Group 11 (cryptlib, Safenet HSM Luna SA-1700, and Feitian and Oberthur
cards) is misclassified as group 12 (smartcard Taisys, 50.2%) or group 20 (Oberthur
Cosmo Dual, 20.4%). This is a very similar case as for group 10.
Group 14 (Microsoft and Crypto++, prevalent group) is misclassified as
group 6 (PGP SDK 4, 23.9%), group 12 (card Taisys, 20.1%), group 13 (card
Gemalto GXP E64, 13.5%) or group 5 (Mocana 6.x, 10.7%). Again, for the TLS
domain, the only real misclassification problem is with the Mocana 6.x library.
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Group 15 (large group with multiple frequently used libraries) is misclassified
as group 12 (card Taisys, 27.2%), group 13 (card Gemalto GXP E64, 18.1%),
group 20 (card Oberthur, 11.7%) or group 6 (PGP SDK 4, 32.3%). For the TLS
domain, no group from the misclassified ones is likely.
Group 17 (Nettle, Cryptix, FlexiProvider) is misclassified as multiple other
groups where only groups 5 (Mocana 6.x) and 9 (Bouncy Castle prior 1.54 and
SunRsaSign OpenJDK 1.8) cannot be ruled out as unlikely for the TLS domain.
Top 1 match Top 2 match Top 3 match
#keys in batch
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Group 4
Group 5
Group 6
Group 7
Group 8
Group 9
Group 10
Group 11
Group 12
Group 13
Group 14
Group 15
Group 16
Group 17
Group 18
Group 19
Group 20
Group 21
Group 22
Group 23
Group 24
Group 25
Group 26
Average
1 2 3 5 10
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
86.3% 98.1% 99.8% 100.0% 100.0%
92.7% 99.3% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0%
60.8% 76.3% 79.8% 90.7% 96.6%
73.0% 88.1% 88.5% 83.5% 69.8%
7.6% 18.9% 30.0% 47.9% 73.6%
16.3% 33.5% 44.2% 54.6% 62.8%
12.8% 28.3% 38.9% 50.9% 61.1%
0.0% 24.7% 47.7% 67.9% 92.0%
6.9% 21.8% 34.2% 51.6% 63.1%
54.9% 75.4% 78.2% 71.5% 65.8%
47.2% 57.0% 69.6% 84.8% 96.3%
6.9% 22.4% 40.8% 70.5% 93.6%
0.2% 28.0% 52.7% 80.0% 96.5%
31.4% 63.6% 79.4% 91.1% 99.4%
5.1% 28.6% 50.2% 78.0% 97.6%
12.2% 55.1% 70.5% 78.5% 84.7%
44.0% 54.4% 59.7% 67.3% 78.5%
81.5% 95.2% 98.7% 99.9% 100.0%
53.0% 77.9% 88.4% 97.0% 99.9%
14.6% 39.2% 53.5% 72.5% 92.3%
77.4% 98.0% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0%
96.8% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
58.3% 86.7% 96.1% 99.7% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
47.7% 64.2% 73.1% 82.2% 89.4%
1 2 3 5 10
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
98.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
94.8% 99.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
71.5% 90.1% 93.6% 98.7% 99.9%
92.8% 92.8% 97.7% 98.2% 99.9%
77.3% 95.5% 98.8% 99.9% 100.0%
27.5% 56.2% 73.5% 91.3% 99.2%
37.7% 65.7% 79.1% 90.4% 99.0%
18.4% 44.1% 60.8% 79.8% 96.1%
56.7% 87.2% 95.9% 99.4% 100.0%
72.2% 85.0% 95.4% 98.1% 100.0%
52.9% 68.6% 80.9% 93.8% 99.5%
7.7% 41.0% 69.7% 90.8% 99.3%
2.5% 43.4% 65.4% 90.2% 99.4%
40.9% 70.6% 85.4% 96.5% 100.0%
18.3% 51.2% 71.9% 92.0% 99.7%
45.2% 91.0% 98.2% 100.0% 100.0%
54.5% 88.3% 97.3% 99.9% 100.0%
97.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
95.2% 99.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
78.0% 98.2% 99.8% 100.0% 100.0%
96.8% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
87.6% 97.9% 99.6% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
66.3% 83.3% 90.9% 96.9% 99.7%
1 2 3 5 10
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
98.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
96.4% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
73.0% 91.3% 97.6% 98.8% 100.0%
96.5% 97.0% 99.5% 99.8% 100.0%
92.7% 99.3% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0%
38.6% 63.9% 81.7% 94.2% 99.5%
48.3% 75.9% 87.8% 96.8% 99.8%
52.7% 87.6% 92.5% 98.5% 100.0%
73.2% 95.2% 99.2% 100.0% 100.0%
89.5% 95.7% 99.0% 99.8% 100.0%
66.4% 82.9% 91.4% 98.0% 99.8%
12.4% 53.7% 78.9% 95.4% 99.9%
28.2% 64.6% 81.0% 94.4% 99.7%
48.3% 80.0% 92.1% 98.8% 100.0%
37.7% 73.0% 89.0% 98.1% 100.0%
76.3% 96.1% 99.4% 100.0% 100.0%
62.1% 93.8% 99.1% 100.0% 100.0%
98.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
97.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
97.2% 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
93.9% 99.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
76.1% 90.4% 95.7% 98.9% 100.0%
Table 5. The average classification accuracy of the best performing Bayes classifier.
In the i-th column we consider a classifier successful if the true source of the key is
among i best guesses of our model. Similarly, for each of the 3 columns we evaluate
the success rate when 1, 2, 3, 5 or 10 keys from the same group are available.
B Obtaining dataset of GCD-factorable keys
The fastgcd [15] tool based on [3] was used to perform the search for the GCD-
factorable keys. Only valid RSA keys were considered8. Running the fastgcd tool
for a high number of keys (around 112 million for Rapid7 dataset) requires an
extensive amount of RAM. Running the tool on a machine with 500 GB of
RAM resulted in only a few factored keys, all sharing just tiny factors, while
the tool did not produce any errors or warnings. The same computation on a
8 The factorization occasionally finds small prime factors up to 216, likely because the
public key (certificate) was damaged, e.g., by a bit flip.
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subset of 10 million keys revealed a substantial number of large factors. Likely,
the fastgcd tool requires even more RAM for the correct functioning with such
a large number of keys. To solve the problem, we partitioned the time-ordered
dataset into two subsets of 50 and 62 million keys with an additional third subset
with 50 million keys that partially overlapped both previous partitions. By doing
so, we miss GCD-factorable keys that appeared in the dataset separated by a
considerable time distance (2-3 years). We hypothesise that if a prevalent source
starts producing GCD-factorable keys, we capture a sufficiently large batch of
them within a single subset. In total, we have acquired 114 thousand unique
factors from the whole dataset.
